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Abstract 
This paper shows how one of the developers of QWERTY continued to use the trade secret 
that underlay its development to seek further efficiency improvements after its introduction.  
It provides further evidence that this was the principle used to design QWERTY in the first 
place and adds further weight to arguments that QWERTY itself was a consequence of 
creative design and an integral part of a highly efficient system rather than an accident of 
history. This further serves to raise questions over QWERTY’s forced servitude as “paradigm 
case” of inferior standard in the path dependence literature. The paper also shows how 
complementarities in forms of intellectual property rights protection played integral roles in 
the development of QWERTY and the search for improvements on it, and also helped 
effectively conceal the source of the efficiency advantages that QWERTY helped deliver.     
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(1) Introduction 1 
This paper builds on Kay (2013a and b) and associated commentaries by Arthur (2013), 
Margolis (2013) and Vergne (2013).  Kay 2013(a) concluded that Christopher Latham 
Sholes’ QWERTY typewriter format “could be regarded as near-optimal for its time in terms 
of crucial features relating to format/device compatibility”. This raises the issue of whether 
Sholes could have improved the efficiency of his device even further in those terms. Here we 
look at how Sholes did indeed pursue that objective.  The evidence is contained in two 
patents filed separately by Sholes some years apart but only issued posthumously.  The 
solution that Sholes found is not evident if the patents are considered independently of each 
other. However, they can be combined like two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle to help reveal 
Sholes intentions. Even then, Sholes solution only becomes clear when the result is 
interpreted in the light of his infrequency meta-rule or principle as explained in Kay (2013a).  
Had a typewriter ever been built integrating specifications set out in these two patents, it 
would have had the potential to outperform QWERTY machines on the crucial performance 
criterion that had helped generate QWERTY’s own efficiency advantages and ensure its 
eventual adoption as dominant standard..        . 
This also provides further evidence to support the arguments in Kay (2013a) that Sholes 
infrequency principle lay behind his original design of QWERTY because it shows he 
continued to apply the principle for new models of typewriters even after he ceased to have 
any direct association with Remington and QWERTY. At the same time, we will show how 
Sholes employed complementarities and timing in the use of different forms of IPR 
(intellectual property rights) protection in a systematic effort to pursue and protect his 
interests in these areas.  In turn, by providing further support for the theoretical arguments in 
Kay (2013a), it may be regarded as reinforcing the conclusions drawn from that paper to the 
effect that QWERTY was deliberately designed and was as near-optimal in terms of crucial 
systems compatibility features as could be reasonably expected with the state of technical 
knowledge of his day.  Given QWERTY’s role as the “paradigm case” (Lewin, 2001) of a 
supposed inferior standard and accident of history in the literature on path dependence, this 
paper is also intended to make a contribution in that context.      
In Section 2 we look at the development of the QWERTY keyboard and the role of the 
infrequency principle in its design, and then consider the genesis of the principle in Section 3.  
Section 4 looks at evidence from history in terms of how firms have exploited 
complementarities in different forms of IPR protection and Section 5 takes up that issue in 
the context of QWERTY and Sholes subsequent efforts to improve on it. We discuss some 
implications in terms of IPR and path dependence in Section 6, and then finish with a short 
concluding section.    
(2) The evolution of QWERTY and the infrequency principle 
  
Arthur (1983 and 1989) and David (1985) outline the basic mechanisms by which technical 
standards can evolve and become locked in to one dominant form, with David looking 
particularly at the case of QWERTY in this context.  David’s (1985) paper sets out the basic 
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conditions of technical interrelatedness, economies of scale and quasi-irreversibility of 
investment which could lead to lock into a particular technical standard.  Technical 
interrelatedness in the case of QWERTY arose from the need for system compatibility 
between the typist’s skills and the keyboard format. Network externalities arose from typists 
trained in one keyboard format (here QWERTY) and in the training market for typing skills.  
Quasi-irreversibility reflected the costs skilled typists would encounter from unlearning 
QWERTY if they switched to another format.   David argued these processes led to 
QWERTY standard becoming “locked-in” as dominant standard even when the 1936 Dvorak 
design displayed what were claimed to be more efficient properties in terms of ergonomic 
design and typing speed.  
 
David (1985) also described QWERTY as reflecting the outcome of a path dependent 
sequence of economic changes in which “important influences upon the eventual outcome 
can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance 
elements rather than systematic forces” (p. 332). David concluded that such early random 
events can lead to the wrong system being adopted and his analysis of QWERTY in this 
connection led to its being widely cited as the paradigm case of path dependence where an 
inferior standard is adopted as a consequence of accidents of history.          
 
 
Figure1: Remington no.7 keyboard and typebasket 
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Before we consider these issues in more detail we consider the circumstances surrounding the 
early development and diffusion of QWERTY. The format was developed in 1872 by 
Chrtopher Latham Sholes working with his partner James Densmore and the basic 
relationship between format and hardware remained essentially unchanged with minor 
modifications over several subsequent models by Remington. Figure 1 shows a stylized top 
elevation representation for the keyboard and typebasket of the later (1896) Remington No. 7. 
The letters on the keyboard were printed with typebars, metal strips with the character to be 
printed on their ends. The typebars hung down in a typebasket forming a shape rather like an 
ice cream cone with the bottom half cut off. When a keyboard key was struck, the 
corresponding typebar swung upwards inside the cone to hit the appropriate point on the 
printed page.  To simply Figure 1 we have represented all non-letter characters such as 
numbers and punctuation with an asterisk in the respective cases.   
As noted in Kay (2013a), a problem that Sholes faced in early typewriter design was that 
adjacent typebars in the typebasket tended to jam (Joyce and Moxley, 1988). Rehr (1997) 
commented that to deal with this problem, “all Sholes needed to do was separate the letter 
pairs by at least one type bar.” (p.4).   
The absence of evidence as to how and why Sholes developed QWERTY has led to much 
speculation down the years, including claims that he used a list of frequent letter pairs to 
separate them on the typebasket and so reduce the chances of jamming. However, Kay 
(2013a) used a combination of basic probability theory and lists of frequent letter pairs in the 
English language to show this strategy would not have been much more effective than 
scattering the letters randomly around the keyboard, or indeed staying with the alphabetic 
ABCDE format that Sholes had started with.  
What Sholes did to solve Rehr’s problem was much simpler and more elegant and effective 
than trying to separate frequent letter pairs. With 26 letters and only 44 typebars (42 in the 
later Remington No. 7), some letters had to be placed next to each other on the typebasket.  
What Sholes did was to turn the problem on its head and did his best to ensure that these 
were infrequent letter pairs in the English language.              
The cases where letters were adjacent to each other on the Remington No. 7 typebasket can 
be seen in Figure 1 as being contained within the string of letters QAZSXDCFVGBHNJMK.  
It is extremely difficult at first sight to think of many words that contain letter pairs 
associated with that sequence read in either direction (e.g. QA or AQ; FV or VF).  Kay 
(2013a) showed with some electronic search experiments on texts that would have been 
popular in Sholes time that the 1873 version of QWERTY was near-optimal in separating 
letters on the typebasket that might be encountered together on the printed page.  Mark 
Twain’s 145,000 word “Life of the Mississippi” (or “LotM”) was cited as indicative text 
(Manis, 1999) and in that case there were only 146 events where words contained letter pairs 
that were also adjacent on the typebasket, or about one such occurrence every 1,000 words.  
This contrasted with a similar experiment using LotM with the Dvorak format which resulted 
in 2358 such pairing events, about 16 times more frequent (Kay 2013a, p.1182). QWERTY 
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was clearly far superior to Dvorak in terms of format/device compatibility expressed in terms 
of its ability to minimise or avoid jamming issues   
Much of the basis for the supposed superiority of Dvorak over QWERTY cited by David 
(1985) and others was based in terms of format/user compatibility issues, notably advantages 
claimed in speed of touch typing for Dvorak over QWERTY.  However, there are at least 
three difficulties with David’s subsequent argument (1985, p.336) that QWERTY was the 
wrong system for the industry to standardise around .  First, Liebowitz and Margolis (1990) 
cast doubt on the empirical evidence used to argue that Dvorak really was superior to 
QWERTY on format/user compatibility grounds. Second, modern ten-finger touch typing 
that Dvorak was designed for in 1936 was very much a later development, and indeed as late 
as 1887 (fourteen years after Remington sold Sholes’ first typewriters) an editorial in a trade 
journal was still arguing that optimal typing speed was achieved by using only the first two 
fingers of each hand (Wershler-Henry, 2005, p.232).  Third, even when touch typing began to 
be widely adopted towards the end of the 19th century, there would have been little point in 
pursuing format/user compatibility (and typing speed) if the user repeatedly encountered 
format/device compatibility issues (and jamming problems).   
Mahoney (2000) cites the evidence on format/user compatibility analysed by Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1990) as calling QWERTY’s role as paradigm case for path dependence into 
question precisely because QWERTY may have been more efficient format compared to 
Dvorak all along (pp. 514-15).  In fact, QWERTY would have been unequivocally 
demonstrably superior to Dvorak on the only efficiency grounds that mattered in the early 
years of the typewriter, format/device compatibility.       
This tends to conflict with David’s (1985) argument that QWERTY’s genesis and eventual 
success was characterised by historical accidents, or random transient factors in the form of 
choices made close to the beginning of the process (p.335).  But it is difficult to characterise 
QWERTY in such a fashion when it was clearly deliberately designed to be as near-optimal 
in terms of the efficiency criteria that really mattered at the time. The evidence tends to less 
consistent with the notion that small chance events can play major roles in the evolution and 
diffusion of technologies, and more consistent with those such as Garud, Kumaraswamy, and 
Karnøe (2010) and Vergne and Durand (2010) who place more emphasis on path creation and 
the role of deliberate and creative design.  It is also tends to be consistent with Hossain and 
Morgan (2009) whose laboratory trials with QWERTY-type outcomes found that in repeated 
experiments the subjects never got stuck on the inefficient platform; and with Liebowitz and 
Margolis’ (2013) broader assertion that it is difficult to find evidence that markets lock 
standards into inferior and inefficient solutions.       
The effectiveness of the infrequency principle in dealing with jamming problems can be 
clearly demonstrated, though the circumstances that led to its development are less clear.  In 
the next section we try to establish how much can be said with reasonable certainty about this 
critical period in the development of the technology.   
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(3) The genesis of the infrequency principle  
The closest to an authoritative account of the development of the typewriter and the roles 
played by Sholes and those associated with him was set out by the academic historian 
Richard N. Current (1954). Current2 faced problems in that his documented sources, 
including letters, memoirs and periodicals were often partial or incomplete, while the claims 
made by the main protagonists often contradicted each other, and sometimes even 
themselves. Current resolved these difficulties as far as he could with original sources and 
validating claims and assertions by cross-checking from alternative sources.    
Current’s account indicates that by early 1871 Sholes’ successive models were still using an 
alphabetical layout for the keyboard (1954, p. 44), but by late 1872 this had been radically 
transformed by Sholes and Densmore into the first version of QWERTY:     
“… some of the letters were so close together that the type bars, hung as they were in 
a circular ‘basket’ collided more frequently than need be.  As experienced printers, 
Sholes and Densmore were familiar with the type case, in which the pieces were 
assorted according to convenience and not according to the alphabet. The two men, 
working together, finally arranged the typewriter keyboard in the spirit of the printer’s 
case, though they did not duplicate its particular arrangement.  They agreed upon a 
pattern – q w e r t y u i o p, etc. – which was to remain almost exactly the same from 
that day to this” (Current, 1954, p. 55)      
Perhaps the first recorded examples of potential network externalities and quasi-reversibility 
in the context of QWERTY was given by Densmore, who noted in November 1872 that “it is 
better to have (the keyboards) all alike”; that the new arrangement meant that he had to 
“unlearn as well as learn”; but also that “the change was better to be made than not” (Current, 
1954, p.59, italics in original). 
So while Sholes was primary responsible for many of the other developments that were to be 
fed into the typewriter, the answer to the question as to who developed QWERTY is that it 
was really jointly developed and agreed by Sholes and Densmore.  As to the question who 
would have known about the infrequency principle at this point, irrespective of who actually 
thought of it, it is difficult to see how and why either of them would have kept the 
justification for such a radical redesign secret from the other. Even though QWERTY is 
about the only major element of these endeavours to this survive to this day, at the time it 
would have been just one more technical fix out of numerous others that Sholes and 
Densmore were grappling with to make their machine work.  Also, Sholes the main inventor 
and Densmore the promoter and financier both needed each other and would have had 
incentives to share the secret and motivate the other to keep committed to an enterprise which 
at more than one point looked fairly hopeless.  We shall see later that Sholes was aware of the 
principle and indeed continued to apply it, but for the above reasons it is probable that 
Densmore was also aware of it.   
When Densmore brokered the deal to produce Sholes’ typewriter with Remington in 1873, 
Remington made some fine tuning to QWERTY which David cites as including placing the R 
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in the top letter line, thus “were assembled into one row all the letters which a salesman 
would need to impress customers by rapidly spelling out the brand name TYPE WRITER” 
(1985, p.333).  It is quite possible that this was on advice from Densmore since Current 
(1954) provides strong evidence that it had been Densmore and not Sholes who coined the 
name “typewriter”, as a single word and unhyphenated.3 
The application of the rule to QWERTY from the 1872 version onwards meant that 
QWERTY proved highly efficient in absolute terms in that it all but eliminated the typebar 
jamming problem arising from neigbouring typebars on the typebasket being typed in 
succession (Kay, 2013a, p.1180). It also led to QWERTY being highly efficient in relative 
terms in that it demonstrated significantly superior performance compared to alternative 
formats such as the alphabetic (ABCDE) format that Sholes started with, or even the Dvorak 
format had that been available in 1872 (Kay 2013a, pp. 1181-82). The rule also meant 
QWERTY achieved levels of performance in those terms that simply would not have been 
feasible had the popularly-believed method of using a list of frequent letter pairs been used 
instead (Kay, 2013a pp.1180-81).  It also explains the placing of the vowels, including why 
“E” and “I” are the only two letters missing from the alphabetic string DFGHJKL4 in the 
third row on the keyboard and why “Q” and “A” are next to each other on the typebasket 
(Kay, 2013a p. 1181). All this is consistent with deliberate development and application of 
the infrequency principle, with Sholes (and possibly also Densmore) being aware of the 
principle and applying it.    
Sholes at least was aware of the infrequency principle in 1872 and had applied it, but was it 
subsequently known to those in Remington who took the 1872 version and made 
modifications to it?  The evidence is that it was.  First, all the changes made by Remington 
from 1872 QWERTY to “modern” QWERTY in 1878 are explicable in terms of the 
consistent and systematic application of the rule (Kay, 2013a, pp. 1181-82). In particular, the 
continuous letter sequences on the typebasket were highly sensitive to perturbations, and 
experiments confirmed that rearranging letters associated with these sequences typically ran 
the danger of creating high-frequency couplings unless the infrequency principle was 
followed (Kay, 2013a, p.1181). Second, experiments showed that not just QWERTY but also 
later modifications (specifically: AZERTY, French; QWERTZ, German; and AZERTY, 
Italian) were all individually crafted with format/device compatibility in mind, and with each 
exhibiting a high degree of sensitivity to linguistic idiosyncrasies in these regards in their 
respective domains (Kay, 2013d).      
So the infrequency principle was known to Sholes and possibly also Densmore, while there 
was also awareness and use of the principle in Remington itself, as evidenced by later 
modifications. This was not surprising; when the initial deal was made with Remington the 
company’s representatives expressed only mild interest, Sholes and Densmore were running 
out of funds and  Densmore in particular was eager to get their typewriter manufactured “at 
almost any cost” (Current, 1954, p. 65). On Densmore’s side, this incentive was heightened 
by his retaining a financial interest in QWERTY’s success in a contract with Remington, 
Sholes was to sell his rights for a fixed sum in 1873 (Wershler-Henry, 2005, p. 70).  
Concealing what would have been one of the strongest selling points for the new technology 
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could have imperilled the whole deal.  In turn, Remington would have an incentive to keep 
the principle secret once it was shared with them.    
But just keeping the infrequency principle a trade secret would not have been sufficient 
protection for the widening number of interested parties who wished to exploit it 
commercially. In the next section we look at how different forms of IPR protection can act in 
complementary fashion before turning to the issue of how this is of relevance in the case of 
QWERTY and Sholes.    
 (4) Complementarities in IPR protection  
IPR can involve a variety of tools including patents, trademarks, copyright and trade secrets. 
In the present context it is the distinction between patents and trade secrets that matters.  The 
most obvious difference between patents and trade secrets lies in disclosure; “a trade secret is 
some sort of information that has value because it is not generally known” (Risch, 2007, p.6). 
While a patent may be disclosed publicly and granted on a new and useful design or process 
for a limited period of time, a trade secret is information which may give a business an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it (Besen, and Raskind, 1991).  
 
The potential importance of complementarity in terms of IPR protection has not been really 
fully recognised until recently, indeed it has been more usual to portray forms of IPR 
protection (including patents and trade secrets) as simply substitutes for each other (e.g. 
Friedman, et.al. 1991; David 1993, p.31; Fisher and Oberholzer-Gee, 2013, p.160).  Where 
complementarities at the level of IPR protection have been recognised it has tended to be 
along the lines of several patented inventions combining as economic complements to 
produce one product (e.g. Cohen et al, 2000, p.22).      
 
However, it is now clear that potential complementarities in IPR protection can extend across 
forms, can include trade secrets, and indeed have been actively sought by firms in different 
industries from the early years of industrialisation to the present day. Arora (1997) cites 
several examples from the late 19th and early 20th century of chemical firms combining 
patents with secrecy, for example by patenting several compounds but retaining secrecy over 
the composition of specific dyestuffs. In other cases, decoy patents could act as chaff and 
help camouflage which patents were really intended to add commercial value.  More recent 
times have seen examples of very different products and processes which have patented some 
elements of the underlying technology while keeping other aspects secret, such as 
Pilkington’s float glass technology (Al-Aali and Teece, 2013, p.26), GEs process for making 
industrial diamonds, a hormone therapy drug produced by Wyeth, and C&F’s technology for 
freezing ingredients for pizza toppings (Jorda, 2013, pp.28-30). Mazzone and Moore (2008, 
pp.57-9) note several ways in which in which patent holders may use undisclosed information 
strategically and to their advantage, while Sherwood (2008) notes that the contribution of 
many research joint ventures can be in the form of a combination of patents and trade secrets 
 
The exploitation of complementarities can extend to other forms of IPR protection, for 
example Henkel et al (2013, p.67) note the case of a flash drive where the binary code was 
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copyrighted while the source code was kept secret. Even more complex combinations are 
possible, for example different aspects of a single data processing system or a 
biotechnological diagnostic kit can be protected by a phalanx of complementary patents, 
copyright registration, trademarks and trade secrets (Jorda, 2008, p.13).  At strategic level, 
Ottoz and Cugno (2008) explore the optimal patent/secret mix for complex products, while at 
policy level Ottoz and Cugno (2011) develop a model of the ideal scope of trade secret law 
where a technology comprises two complementary components, one of which is patented and 
one is secret.  
  
The traditional notion that patents and trade secrets may be regarded as substitute forms of 
IPR protection has also been expressed in the argument that the choice between trade secret 
and patent is a matter of comparing relative costs and benefits; in this perspective, trade 
secrets are said to be preferred if the patent option would be more costly or less rewarding 
than the trade secret (Friedman et al,1991, p.64). However, in the case of the development of 
QWERTY there really was no choice over the forms and combinations of IPR protection that 
had to be adopted. The intellectual property of concern to Sholes and his collaborators related 
to the machinery; the QWERTY format; and the infrequency principle. The first two forms of 
intellectual property would be made public as soon as the devices that embodied them came 
on the market so trade secret was simply not an option here; Sholes patent for his 
“improvement in type-writing machines” that included the QWERTY format was eventually 
published as US patent 207559 in 1878.  Similarly, patenting was not an option for the 
infrequency principle, the US Supreme Court had already ruled that an abstract idea such as 
the discovery of a new principle was not patentable but had to be embodied and brought into 
operation by machinery to produce a new and useful result (US Supreme Court. 1852)5.  
 
The complementarity of patent and trade secret protection was not a choice for Sholes and his 
partners, it was a necessity if they were to defend their intellectual property successfully.  
Take away the patent aspect and imitators could have simply cloned his typewriter once it 
began to show commercial promise. Take away the trade secret aspect and rivals could have 
developed alternative formats using the infrequency principle.     
    
In the next section we explore how Sholes’ search for improvements to QWERTY led him 
into even more sophisticated combinations of IPR protection.    
 
(5) Sholes and the search for the “perfect” typewriting machine           
Kay (2013a) notes that given the tools and the information available to Sholes in his day, any 
further improvements in respect of format/device compatibility would probably have been 
marginal and difficult to achieve” (p,1181).  But as we shall see, that did not prevent Sholes 
from trying. A clue as to whether Sholes could have improved the performance of QWERTY 
in format/device compatibility terms can be found in the six asterisks clustered together on 
the right of the Remington No. 7 typebasket in Figure 1.  In reality, the asterisks in question 
were punctuation marks or fractions.  However, in addition to their assigned role in 
representing a specific character, asterisks on the typebasket could also play a secondary role 
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as buffers separating letters from each other. This buffering role is shown to great effect 
along the top of the typebasket where all the vowels were buffered from immediate proximity 
with any other letters (except for A which was largely neutralized by being buffered between 
Q and Z).  Given the active role that vowels can play in forming frequent letter pairs, 
buffering in this fashion ensured that these vowels were not adjacent to any other letter on the 
typebasket. But if we were to assess QWERTY in the Remington No. 7 as to how effectively 
that buffering function was pursued, it is clear that the cluster of six asterisks represent 
potentially wasted opportunities seen in those terms, with some asterisks just buffering other 
asterisks instead of letters.      
 
Figure 2: Top elevation from Sholes patent US 558428   
The first Sholes patent we shall look at in this connection is US patent 558428, filed 
December 31, 1881, but only issued (posthumously) to Sholes April 14, 1896. Figure 2 
shows an image from this patent with a top elevation view for a 45 character keyboard and 
elliptical typebasket.  The keyboard is arranged in four rows of 11, 12 11 and 11 characters 
respectively (where the keys are not indicated their existence and position can be inferred 
from the levers connecting to the typebasket).  The levers follow the Sholes protocol for 
QWERTY by connecting the characters from the top two rows of the keyboard to the top half 
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of the typebasket in alternating fashion; so for example £&Z from the end of the first row and 
DGK from the end of the second row alternate with each other on the typebasket to form 
£D&GZK there.  Similarly, the levers connecting the lower two rows of the keyboard to the 
typebasket also do so in alternating fashion on the lower half of the typebasket in Figure 2.  
Although we can see from the diagram how the keyboard was intended to connect to the 
typebasket, the patent only gives a very partial indication of what the character arrangement 
would be.  It specified only 18 out of 45 characters, such as X and K anchoring the ends of 
the second row.   
But Sholes later filed another patent (US 568630) on September 11, 1889, this was later 
issued (again posthumously) September 29, 1896.  This patent also describes a 45 character 
keyboard and elliptical typebasket with the keyboard again arranged in four rows of 11, 12 11 
and 11 characters respectively.  The top view elevation for this patent is shown in Figure 3.     
 
Figure 3: Diagram from Sholes patent US 568630 
Not only do the technical specifications for the two patents complement each other, so do the 
keyboards in the respective cases with 11 keys in each row except for the second row which 
has 12. The full keyboard here exactly matches the ten characters in the top three rows that 
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were actually specified in the earlier patent (£, &, Z, X, D, G, K, O, U and Y), and also the 
two end punctuation marks on the bottom row. There is some minor churning of other (non-
letter) characters in the bottom row compared to those that were specified in the earlier 
patent, but in both cases they are mutually consistent insofar far as they both have non-letters 
on these parts of the bottom row where QWERTY had letters. The swapping of places by 
some punctuation marks between the two patents would have had absolutely no impact as far 
as the application of the infrequency principle was concerned.             
(6) Ingredients and recipe for a near-perfect type-writing machine?  
We can explore what Sholes typewriter would have looked like if he had built one with the 
hardware platform in Figure 2 hosting the keyboard arrangement in Figure 3.  We show this 
in Figure 4. Again for simplicity we have replaced all non-letters in the figure with asterisks. 
 
Figure 4: Patent 558428 hardware combined with patent 568630 format 
The first point to note is that by populating most of the bottom row of the keyboard with non-
letters (mostly punctuation), one result is that every non-letter is fully employed as a buffer 
preventing letters from being adjacent to other letters on the typebasket, including the five 
vowels A, E, I, O and U.  That still means that some letters have to be next to each other on 
the typebasket in two sequences XQJVB and GZKY; however, it does mean that the actual 
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numbers of letter pairs that can be formed out of these sequences on the typebasket is less 
than in any of the QWERTY cases developed up to that point by first Sholes and later 
Remington.         
The next point to consider is whether what we shall describe as the QV format6 (from the 
first two letters on the bottom row) would have been potentially more efficient than 
QWERTY in terms of format/device compatibility and reduced chances of jamming from 
typing letter pairs that were also adjacent on the typebasket. We compared how QWERTY on 
the Remington No. 7 would have performed against QV on Sholes elliptical typebasket in 
these terms using a number of test texts.  We show the results for LotM as indicative text in 
Table 1. Table 1 also shows the results for the alphabetic or ABCDE format that Sholes 
originally started with (the alphabetic or ABCDE format would have replaced QWERTY’s 
typebasket continuous letter string QAZSXDCFVGBHNJMK with 
AKTLUMVNWOXPYQZR) 
ABCDE format QWERTY format QV format 
Pairing Frequency Pairing Frequency Pairing Frequency 
AK/KA 740 QA/AQ 2 XQ/QX 3 
KT/TK 4 AZ/ZA 73 QJ/JQ 0 
TL/LT 1166 ZS/SZ 0 JV/VJ 0 
LU/UL 2214 SX/XS 1 VB/BV 2 
UM/MU 953 XD/DX 0 GZ/ZG 0 
MV/VM 0 DC/CD 9 ZK/KZ 0 
VN/NV 141 CF/FC 0 KY/YK 54 
NW/WN 788 FV/VF 0 Total 59 
WO/OW 3919 VG/GV 0  
OX/XO 34 GB/BG 2 Modified QV format 
XP/PX 196 BH/HB 22 Pairing Frequency 
PY/YP 59 HN/NH 66 YQ/QY 0 
YQ/QY 0 NJ/JN 45 QJ/JQ 0 
QZ/ZQ 0 JM/MJ 2 JV/VJ 0 
ZR/RZ 0 MK/KM 14 VF/FV 0 
Total 10,214 Total 238 MZ/ZM 0 
 ZK/KZ 0 
KX/XK 0 
Total 0 
Table 1: Pairing frequencies for ABCDE, QWERTY, QV and modified QV on LotM 
We can use the ABCDE format as benchmark for the performance of the QWERTY and QV 
formats in terms of format/device compatibility. In the case of LotM, the ABCDE format had 
10,214 occurrences of letter pairs on the printed page that were also next to each other on the 
typebasket, or about once every 14 words.  By contrast, QWERTY would have encountered 
such events about once every 609 words while QV would have met the same fate about once 
every 2458 words.  These results with LotM, were found to be broadly in line with results 
from other 19th century American English test cases.  
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While both QWERTY and QV were clearly superior in terms of format/device compatibility 
with the original ABCDE format, the QV format was clearly superior to QWERTY with 
implied efficiency benefits.  As such, it is also consistent with Sholes applying his 
infrequency principle in developing his QV format.  
But was this the best Sholes could have achieved in those terms or could he have done better 
still? We can take his solution a stage further towards his goal with the help of modern tools.  
Suppose, for example, Sholes had swapped Y and X, F and B, M and G, that would have 
made the two continuous letter sequences YQJVF and MZKX on the typebasket. Running the 
pairs associated with those sequences through LotM resulted in zero events (“ex-
keelboatmen” which came up as an XK pairing would in practice have had a hyphen 
interposing between X and K). The results are shown in Table 1 for this “modified QV” 
format where it achieved a perfect score with no incidences of letter pairs in LotM that were 
also adjacent to each on the typebasket.   
The online PDF experiments were run with a series of other popular American novels 
roughly contemporaneous with Sholes.7  Again, no incidences of letter pairs in text that were 
adjacent to each other on the typebasket were found in a total (including LotM) of about 
1,110,000 words of text.  While these results might suggest that modified QV might be 
considered at least a tentative candidate as optimal configuration in those terms, the same 
experiments suggested that there might not be a uniquely optimal solution.  For example, 
replacing G with S rather than M led to the same perfect results with no letter pair events in 
any of the texts tested. In other cases with alternative substitutions, it was only obscure or 
foreign words which prevented perfect scores. However, this might be thought sufficient to 
demonstrate that Sholes’ infrequency principle could have been used to design an optimal 
format in terms of this crucial design criterion..      
But it is important to note that we were to achieve our “modified QV” results with the help of 
tools which were not available to Sholes in his day. First, we were able to access online PDFs 
for whole texts like LotM and use the Reader search tool to check the incidence of specific 
letter pairs in the text (making sure that the “whole words only” box was not ticked). 
Second, we were aided by the popularity of the 20th century word game Scrabble. In a sense, 
what Sholes was doing could be described as playing anti-Scrabble.  Instead of searching for 
words that contained a specific letter pair as in Scrabble, he was searching for letter pairs that 
were not contained in any words.   We were able to access online search tools designed to 
help Scrabble players, with one website8 being particularly useful in helping play “anti-
Scrabble”. We were able to use this tool to confirm the general absence of recognised words 
containing new letter pairs that would result from these swaps before we even trialled the 
effect on actual texts.9 
Finally, different PDF searches with successive iterations could quickly experiment with 
alternative possibilities, simply eliminating those that resulted in any letter pair events.  
Sholes had none of these advantages in the 19th century.  Sholes had done the hard creative 
work of developing the infrequency principle and the QV format, and it would have been 
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difficult for him to achieve superior solutions with the limited tools available to him in his 
day.  However, in a counterfactual world where he did have access to these tools he could 
easily have developed the “perfect” type-writing machine in terms of format/device 
compatibility and Rehr’s problems of separating letter  pairs on the printed page by at least 
one typebar on the typebasket .       
But would it have been worth the effort?  The QV format only had about a quarter of the 
incidences of pairing frequencies on LotM as did QWERTY, while the modified QV format 
had none.  But another way of looking at the same results is that while QWERTY reduced the 
pairing frequencies by 97.7% on LotM compared to ABCDE, the QV format could have 
reduced the frequency of these pairings by a further 1.8% and modified QV by 2.3%.  So 
while QV would have reflected quite an advance in these terms if just compared to 
QWERTY, the incremental gains in efficiency compared to what had already been achieved 
by QWERTY are actually quite modest.10   
(6) Discussion  
Sholes subsequent attempts to patent the “perfect” typewriting machine (at least in terms of 
format/device compatibility) helps explain more fully Sholes behavior with respect to 
QWERTY. Kay 2013 (a) had asked:  
“ …if Sholes did deliberately apply a rule based on the conjunction of infrequency 
and contiguity, why did he apparently take the secret to the grave with him (he died in 
1890)? It is obvious that the rule would have been concealed in 1873 and soon after to 
protect intellectual property, but why not eventually confide in friends or family and 
for the sake of posterity and his reputation?  
 
In fact, Sholes had sold his rights to QWERTY for a fixed sum in 1873, but his two 
partners, Densmore and Yost, retained a financial interest in QWERTY’s success in a 
contract with Remington (Wershler-Henry, 2005, p. 70). Wershler-Henry describes 
Sholes as worn down by the various trials and tribulations associated with the 
development of QWERTY. By the late 1880s Sholes had totally disowned his own 
invention, refusing to own one, use one, or even recommend it (Wershler-Henry, 
2005, p. 67). If you do not value your own creation, or what others had done with it, 
then you would not expect other people to, either” (Kay, 2013a, p.1181).  
 
All that was strictly true, but these later patents make it clear that there was a deeper reason 
why Sholes had stayed silent apart from disparaging the outcome of his earlier efforts. It was 
not QWERTY the patent which Sholes valued as his own creation, but the trade secret that 
was the infrequency principle and of which QWERTY was only one of many possible 
embodiments. Sholes was still aiming to create a superior alternative to QWERTY and he 
now had every reason to regard QWERTY as a rival solution. And as long as he harboured 
the ambition to develop a better alternative to QWERTY either for himself or to help secure 
his family’s financial future, it also helps explain why he took the secret of the infrequency 
principle to the grave with him.  
17 
 
 
Delays in filing patents here could be explained in part in that it could delay their subsequent 
expiration (Current, 1954, p. 134).  But that still leaves the question of why the two crucial 
constituent elements were contained in two separate patents filed years apart, the first largely 
hardware-based with the Sholes protocol and an elliptical typebasket, and the second largely 
based around the QV format. If the infrequency principle was still not publicly obvious even 
after there had been opportunities to reverse engineer the Remington platforms that carried 
QWERTY, where were the risks in a single patent for the QV format and the hardware that 
would carry it, just as Sholes had done with his 1878 QWERTY patent? 
 
The obvious risks here lay in that Sholes knew that the trade secret was now in the hands of 
what was now his rival, Remington, and its successors.11  Remington had begun selling 
Sholes’ typewriter in 1873 and by November 1875 had acquired the exclusive rights to make 
and sell typewriters using the Sholes patents (Current, 1954, p. 82). A single patent 
combining hardware and format would have made his intentions clear to those who were in 
possession of the trade secret.  Further, even though Densmore had a financial interest in the 
success of Remington typewriters, he continued to cooperate with Sholes and urge him to 
invent an improved typewriter.  Remington had been threatening Densmore with law suits for 
alleged breaches as early as 1880 because of Densmore efforts to develop alternative 
typewriters (Current, 1954, p.100), So it would have been a rational strategy for Sholes to 
fragment the QV solution into different patents filed well apart and with a curious elliptical 
typebasket (which, irrespective of any contribution it might make in terms of functionality, at 
least differentiated it from the original QWERTY typebasket).  
 
This strategy would have been aided by the fact that the two patents in question here were 
only two of several Sholes patents filed after 1873, potentially making it more difficult to see 
the connections between the two that really matter here.  Two other patents12 were filed by 
Sholes in between the two patents we are discussing here, while five other were filed 
posthumously (four of them the day after his death in February 17, 1890).13  None of these 
other patterns contained the crucial keyboard references we are concerned with here.   
 
The combination of patent with secrecy in this context was first reflected in the 1878 
QWERTY patent which is itself an excellent example of how patents and trade secrets can be 
complementary as well as alternative methods for the protection of intellectual property.  It 
appears that Sholes took this process even further with fragmented patents and a trade secret 
in order to conceal his intentions from his erstwhile partner Remington.  But as noted earlier, 
it has become clear in recent years that Sholes was not alone in framing complex IPR 
protection strategies involving complementary forms of IPR protection. Arora (1997) gives a 
number of examples of such complementarities, but there is one practice roughly 
contemporaneous with Sholes from the 19th century chemical industry that is particularly 
relevant in the present context.       
 
“German companies skilfully combined patents and secrecy to keep potential 
imitators at bay. The dyestuffs were typically composed of a number of different 
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compounds. In some cases, the precise composition of the dyestuff was kept secret, 
but the individual compounds protected by patents” (Arora, 1997, p.393)   
 
Sholes similarly combined trade secret with the rest of the QV solution split into two out of 
his several post-1873 patents, and the two patents in question filed years apart.  The widely 
reported speculation that he used a list of frequent letter pairs to separate these pairs on the 
typebasket may have been deliberately started by Sholes or his partners to put potential rivals 
off the scent.  Even if they did not start the speculation, it would have been rational not to 
deny it.      
 
But what would have been Remington’s reaction had Sholes attempts to use the infrequency 
principle to improve on QWERTY become apparent to them? Remington could not challenge 
for patent infringement because the principle was not patented. A reasonable fear that Sholes 
might have had is that by confirming that QWERTY could indeed be improved on, 
Remington would direct their attention towards the same end. Even more likely was that 
Sholes simply wanted to escape the attention of Remington and not have such a well-
resourced rival focus its ire on him.          
 
What is ironic is that Sholes efforts were doomed to failure.  By the late 1880s QWERTY 
was rapidly moving towards lock-in as industry standard, effectively pre-empting attempts 
from even its own creator to dislodge it from that position, especially since any efficiency 
gains in terms of format/device compatibility from the QV format would have been marginal 
at best.  In turn, soon after Sholes’ later patents were issued in 1896, Underwood was to 
launch a revolution in typewriter design with their front-strike or front-stroke designs 
replacing the Remington up-strike or up-stroke design as dominant hardware standard within 
a few years (while still retaining QWERTY as universal keyboard standard). QV’s 
format/device compatibility advantages were specific to up-strike design; since the front-
strike typebaskets were radically different from those in up-strike even QWERTY 
encountered severe format/device compatibility problems in being in adopted on a front-
strike platforms (Kay, 2013c), and much the same could have been expected from the QV 
format.           
 
(7) Conclusions     
Sholes almost achieved his aim of creating what would have been at the time the “perfect” 
type-writing machine in terms of the performance parameter that mattered at the time, and we 
have shown with the help of modern tools how he could have achieved that aim (though it is 
likely there would have been no single unique optimal solution).  But, ironically, QWERTY 
had been so well designed in the first place that any efficiency gains from QV or “modified  
QV” would have been marginal at best and swept aside by QWERTY which was rapidly 
becoming locked in as industry standard.  What this helps emphasize is that QWERTY was 
only one of many possible embodiments of the infrequency principle, and it was that 
underlying principle embodied in QWERTY and ingeniously integrated with the hardware in 
Sholes’ devices that really helped win the battle of the standards.  
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However none of this would have been possible had Sholes not used a judicious blend of 
complementary trade secret and patent protection from the beginning. Most trade secrets tend 
to be “wasting assets” dissipating after an average of 3-5 years because of employee mobility 
and reverse engineering, though with some exceptions such as Coca Cola’s recipe which has 
been secret for over 100 years (Jorda, 2008).  Sholes infrequency principle had a useful 
economic life of about a quarter of a century before the development of upstrike typewriter 
technology made it obsolete, but it still stayed secret for 140 years despite the considerable 
interest in the provenance and genesis of QWERTY. In view of the central role that these 
issues played in the evolution of this standard, it also raises interesting questions for future 
research as to whether such complementarities may have played key but unappreciated roles 
in the development of other standards.  
By showing how Sholes used his infrequency principle in further efforts to improve on the 
QWERTY format in efficiency terms, this paper adds further weight of evidence that this was 
indeed the principle that he and his partner Densmore used to design QWERTY in the first 
place.  As such, it helps to strengthen the conclusions of Kay (2013a) that QWERTY was a 
consequence of creative design rather than an accident of history, indeed QWERTY was as 
near-optimal in terms of the crucial performance criterion of format/device compatibility as 
could be reasonably expected with the state of technical knowledge that existed in Sholes’ 
time. This in turn helps reinforce arguments in Kay (2013a) that QWERTY’s role as 
“paradigm case” of inferior standard in the path dependence literature is not consistent with 
the evidence, and that instead the case is more consistent with path creation than with path 
dependence.    
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Martin Kenney for drawing my attention to the diagram for Sholes U.S. Patent No. 568,630 
which was the first clue that Sholes had indeed tried to improve on QWERTY.     
2 Richard N. Current’s appointments included professorships of history at the University of Illinois and North 
Carolina (Greensboro), he was best known for his biographical works on Lincoln.  On his death at the age of 
100, the New York Times carried an obituary (Weber, 2012) in which Mark E. Neely, a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
Penn State professor described Current as a “demythologizer”.  The description is ironic given the various myths 
surrounding the development of the typewriter that have gained currency since Current (1954), many of which 
would not have gained traction had Current’s work been given the attention it deserved. 
3 Densmore names it as such in 1871 in correspondence (Current, 1954, p. 48) and indeed he disliked the 
subsequent labelling of it in 1874 as the “Type-Writer” (Current, 1954, p. 69 and footnote), while by the late-
1880s, Sholes was still describing it in correspondence as the “type-writer” (Current, 1954, p.123), 
4 In the first versions of QWERTY, M was also included at the end of this alphabetic string   
5 The notion that abstract ideas or principles are not patentable is well established and generally accepted, 
though what constitutes a non-patentable principle can be less clear (Durham, 2011). In the case of QWERTY it 
is not difficult to see problems that could have arisen from patenting such an idea, had that been permitted. If it 
had been patented, this could have had a stultifying effect on technical progress. For example, would such a 
patent force all third parties to deliberately place more frequent letter pairs next to each other on continuous 
sequences on their typebaskets to avoid breaches of such a patent?   And how would infrequent letter pairs be 
identified and categorised?  For such reasons patentability has generally been restricted to specific means for 
exploiting a principle rather than being seen as applicable to the principle itself.     
6 If we were being consistent with the naming of QWERTY we would have labelled this the XPMCHR format 
for the first six letters in the second row but QV seems both more appropriate and easier to say. 
7 The PDFs in each case were quickly accessible by Googling “PDF” after the tile. The texts were: Little Women 
(Louisa May Alcott, 1868); The Last of the Mohicans (James Fenimore Cooper, 1826); The American (Henry 
James, 1877); Moby Dick (Herman Melville, 1861); Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Harriet Beecher Stowe, 1852) and 
Walden (Henry David Thoreau, 1864). The results were consistent with those for LotM with modified QV 
beating QV which in turn beat QWERTY in terms of letter pair events in each case. Modified QV produced no 
letter pair events in any of these cases.  
8 The website was  http://www.scrabblefinder.com  (accessed 18th May 2013)  
9 To play “anti-Scrabble” with  http://www.scrabblefinder.com , first select the letters pair to be searched for, 
say KX.  Then search viz: http://www.scrabblefinder.com/contains/kx/. The page should indicate that there are 
no words found that contain that letter pair.  The page also gives options to search for words that begin with KX 
and also words that end with KX.  No known words with that letter pair were identified in any of these options 
(searches conducted 18th May 2013)   
10 In principle, Sholes could have been able to at least match these results with a 52-character keyboard, middle 
two rows letters, the other two rows non-letters, and all letters flanked by an asterisk.  But this would have 
risked making his solution obvious and one motive behind publishing the hardware and format patents 
separately would have been commercial secrecy. Also more characters would have meant bigger keyboards, 
typebaskets and casings, and early typewriters were already expensive and bulky products.       
11 E. Remington and Sons sold its typewriter business in 1886 to the Standard Typewriter Manufacturing 
Company, which changed its name to Remington Typewriter Company. 
12 Patent numbers 418239 and 464902 
13 Patent numbers 464903, 559621, 559755, 559756, 583156 
